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Extraterritoriality and Comparative Institutional Analysis: A Response to 
Professor Meyer 
 
ZACHARY D. CLOPTON* & P. BARTHOLOMEW QUINTANS** 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, the Supreme Court has applied the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to narrow the reach of U.S. securities law in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, Ltd.1 and international-law tort claims in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.2 By their 
terms, these decisions are limited to the interpretation of ambiguous federal statutes and claims 
under the Alien Tort Statute.3 A potential unintended consequence of these decisions, therefore, 
is that future plaintiffs will turn to common law causes of action derived from state and foreign 
law, potentially filing such suits in state courts.4 These causes of action may include “human 
rights claims that arise from multinationals’ corporate activity,” as well as “a range of claims by 
U.S. citizens when they are injured abroad, such as when they are victims of foreign terrorist 
activity.”5  
Professor Jeffrey A. Meyer’s important study observes that debates about extraterritoriality 
are likely to turn to common law causes of action, particularly as plaintiffs turn to these options 
in the wake of Kiobel. The thrust of Meyer’s article is a concern that future courts may consider 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to common law claims, an outcome Meyer 
believes is unwarranted. On Meyer’s account, courts apply the presumption to statutes to avoid 
the “intrusion on the coequal regulatory authority of foreign sovereign states.”6 Meyer argues 
that several features of common law justify insulating it from the presumption: common law is 
“common” in its universal content, “commoner” in its bottom-up origins, and “constrained” in its 
development.7  
Meyer’s article raises appropriate concern over an under-studied issue. Recognizing that a 
focus on statutory interpretation has obscured the relevance of common law to many debates 
about extraterritoriality, Meyer rightly focuses on post-Kiobel (and post-Morrison) state law 
claims. He also points out that conflict of laws has a role in these cases alongside the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Meyer’s account is insufficient, however, when it comes 
to the comparison between common law and statutory law, and more importantly when it comes 
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1. 561 U.S. 247, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010). 
2. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
3. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881; Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669. 
4. For an excellent series of papers on these issues, see Symposium, Human Rights Litigation in States Courts and 
Under State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2013). 
5. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Extraterritorial Common Law: Does the Common Law Apply Abroad?, 102 GEO. L.J. 301, 314 
(2014). 
6. Id. at 307. 
7. Id. at 334–49. 
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to the normative consequences of those comparisons for extraterritoriality.8 Meyer acknowledges 
many potential virtues of common law, but he does not consider judicial lawmaking in 
comparison to the legislative alternative. Even if Meyer is correct in his praise of common law, 
his analysis does not establish that all common law causes of action deserve extraterritorial 
treatment (subject to choice of law) while statutory ones do not. A review of Meyer’s three 
features of common law—that it is “common,” “commoner” and “constrained”—reveals why 
these comparative institutional considerations are necessary for a complete picture of 
extraterritoriality, and indeed present perhaps the best hope for achieving Meyer’s goals of 
consistency, access to justice in U.S. courts, and regulatory harmony between co-equal 
sovereigns.9  
Our comments in this essay are agnostic on the prescriptive reach of U.S. law—we take no 
position here on the merits of territoriality, universality, and all options in between.10 Instead, our 
question is whether judge-made common law should receive systematically different (indeed, 
more expansive) treatment than its statutory analog.11 By reviewing Meyer’s three features of 
common law, we hope to question the distinction with statutory law and call for further research 
on extraterritorial lawmaking across institutions. 
I. COMMON LAW AS “COMMON” 
Meyer’s first claim is that the common law is more “common” than statutes in that it draws 
from principles that transcend geographic boundaries. 12  Applying truly “common” laws 
extraterritorially should not create conflicts with foreign sovereigns or subject defendants to 
unfair surprise.13 Therefore, Meyer attempts to introduce a qualified measure of certainty by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8. It would be a different story if Meyer took as given a presumption against extraterritoriality for statutes and 
expressly tried to prevent a similar fate for common law. But this does not seem to be his purpose in comparing 
common law to statutory law. See, e.g., id. at 335 (asserting that “general differences between the common law and 
statutes suggest . . . that common law sometimes has (and should have) a broader geographical reach than statutory 
law”). 
9. As Katherine Florey has explained, due process and interstate harmony exhibit a “basic unity,” and thus courts 
should not “separat[e] the constitutional treatment of state courts’ choice-of-law decisions from that of 
extraterritorial state regulation.” Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the 
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1134 (2009). 
10. Prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction is defined as power “to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, 
or status of persons, or the interests of persons in things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by 
administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 401(a) (1987). Here we are dealing with the related issue of the prescriptive reach of a law, not the inherent 
authority of the lawmaker to regulate. 
11. Meyer’s analysis implies that state statutes are subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality and common 
law causes of action receive choice of law analysis. In fact, state laws (common law or statutory) typically receive 
choice-of-law analysis, while federal courts apply only the presumption to federal statutes. See generally Caleb 
Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 
(2013). At any rate, our critique turns on the branch that makes the law (judges versus legislatures), not whether the 
law would be subject to choice-of-law analysis. 
12. Meyer, supra note 5, at 336–40. 
13. For example, Meyer suggests that “[t]he common law of torts protects many rights that are so basic—for 
example, a right to be free from arbitrary physical violence and imprisonment—that it is reasonable absent contrary 
evidence to presume that the same protections apply in foreign lands.” Meyer, supra note 5, at 337. Anthony 
Colangelo makes a similar argument for his “unified approach,” in which the presumption against extraterritoriality 	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arguing that courts should apply a presumption of worldwide applicability to common law 
(subject to choice-of-law rules) because common law is common.14 
As an empirical matter, it is possible that there is greater worldwide commonality among 
common law sources than statutory sources.15 But whether common law causes of action are 
more “common” on average than statutory ones is beside the point. The potential harms to 
international relations or due process do not arise from a lack of universality in general but from 
the lack of universality in specific cases. Why, then, would we look to average levels of 
universality instead of asking whether in a given case the cause of action is universal, or to use 
Meyer’s vocabulary, whether it accords with the law of the co-equal state also possessing 
jurisdiction and a regulatory interest?  
Brainerd Currie’s approach to conflict of laws highlights the shortcomings of Meyer’s 
“common law as common” approach. In Currie’s analysis, situations in which the laws of both 
states would produce the same outcome are a type of “false conflict,” in which courts need not 
resolve conflicting instructions.16 On the other hand, Currie honed in on “true conflicts,” in 
which two sets of laws point in different directions. True conflicts thus present the more 
challenging task for courts. What does Currie’s analysis tell us here? First, both true and false 
conflicts can arise between two statutes, two common law sources, or a mix. The true-false 
distinction does not turn on whether the state has a common law or statutory rule for battery, for 
example, but instead looks to see if the two states with interests in the case have the same rule in 
substance. Meyer’s claim that “common law is common” is thus less precise at identifying 
commonality than a case-by-case analysis.  
Second, by separating true and false conflicts, we can think more clearly about Meyer’s 
recommendations. For the type of false conflicts described above, Meyer’s concern about a 
presumption against extraterritoriality is misplaced, because no matter which law applies, the 
outcome is the same. For true conflicts, which may arise from common law or statutory sources, 
Meyer’s account simply does not help with the admittedly difficult task of resolving conflicting 
instructions. That is, of course, unless Meyer can establish that common law has an advantage 
over statutory law independent of the degree of commonality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should never apply when the underlying source of the law is international law (that should apply everywhere). See 
generally Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019 (2011). 
14. More precisely, Meyer acknowledges that modern choice-of-law rules, in their design and application, exhibit a 
preference for forum law. He worries about the marginal group of cases to which forum law would apply under 
conflict-of-laws analysis, but for which the presumption against extraterritoriality would defeat the application of 
forum law. Meyer, supra note 5, at 305.  
15. Were we to accept that a generalizable distinction should apply, it may be that other distinctions would serve 
Meyer better. For example, perhaps private law is typically more universal than public law. This distinction would 
lump common law and statutory battery together but treat separately several of the examples Meyer cites: federal 
labor law, Civil Rights Act employment provisions, federal criminal law, and securities law. Meyer, supra note 5, at 
311–12. Or perhaps we should assess the cause of action’s relationship to common law independent of its current 
form, thus including statutory codifications of common law norms with other common law causes of action. Still 
another approach would differentiate cases by type. For example, one of us has suggested different presumptions for 
criminal, civil, and administrative cases. See generally Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2014).  
16. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAW 107–10 (1963).  
2013] RESPONSE: EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 31 
II. COMMON LAW AS “COMMONER” AND “CONSTRAINED” 
Meyer’s second and third arguments seek to explain why common law might be normatively 
preferable to statutory law overall. Both of these claims overstate the distinction between 
common law and statutes, and neither establishes that common law presumptively should reach 
extraterritorially and statutes should not.  
Meyer claims that the common law is “commoner” in that it derives from the experience of 
common people, not legislatures, and therefore does not represent a “top-down” legislative intent 
prone to clashes with co-equal sovereigns.17 Rather, he suggests that “common law originates 
bottom-up from long-established customs and practices of people, including from lawyers and 
judges as participants in iterative dispute resolution processes.”18 But this view of common law 
is unrealistic. Meyer understates the elite and top-down nature of judges as common law 
makers.19 Further, paralleling our comments above, even if Meyer is correct on average, there is 
no reason to believe that every common law cause of action is more organic and long established 
than every statutory claim. To repeat an earlier example, it is hard to believe that a state’s choice 
to codify common law battery makes it less “commoner” than the common law rule. 
Meyer also suggests that we should tolerate extraterritorial common law because common 
law is constrained by its development from the retrospective resolution of individual disputes.20 
One could argue that in the abstract, “[c]ourts must resolve the dispute before them and need not 
declare principles,” while “[l]egislatures must declare general principles and do not generally 
resolve single disputes.”21 But this description overstates the distinction. Judges articulate 
common law rules not only with respect to local disputes, but also with future disputes in mind, 
and it is not at all clear that every common law solution is necessarily more constrained than its 
statutory counterpart. 
More importantly, even if Meyer is correct that common law is “commoner” and 
“constrained,” Meyer does not explain why, on the particular question of a law’s geographic 
reach, we should believe that judge-made common law necessarily deserves greater breadth than 
statutory law. Institutionally, there are reasons to believe that legislators, rather than judges, are 
better placed to assess the proper reach of substantive law. A full account of extraterritorial 
policy-making must consider accountability, legitimacy, democracy, and expertise, all of which 
conceivably augur in favor of legislative rather than judge-made law. Meyer may be right to 
suggest that common law rules arise in response to specific disputes, but this characteristic could 
be more of a bug than a feature if it is more difficult for judges to account for interests outside of 
the instant dispute—such as sovereign equality, predictability, and notice—that motivate the 
rules of prescriptive jurisdiction. Meyer also argues that “it is most reasonable to presume the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17. See Meyer, supra note 5, at 340. 
18. Id. 
19. Meyer acknowledges that judge-made common law exists by and through governmental authority, yet he 
maintains that common law nonetheless “arises organically from people’s relationships and that it functions apart 
from territorially deterministic concerns.” Meyer, supra note 5, at 342. For a discussion of the breakdown of 
Blackstone’s “oracular” model of common law, see William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of 
Constitutional Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 912–14 (1988). 
20. Meyer, supra note 5, at 342–49. 
21. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 937 (2006). 
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intent of legislators only to regulate activity that corresponds to their territorial zone of 
authority.”22 But why would we think that legislators, who are responsible for external as well as 
internal relations, are more territorially focused than judges resolving a series of individual 
disputes? Meyer may be correct to say that common law likely would not offend co-equal 
sovereigns, but none of his analysis establishes that the risk of offense is less in the judiciary than 
in the legislature, and certainly he does not show that this difference would exist so routinely as 
to justify a blanket rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Meyer has drawn attention to a pressing area for further discussion—the extraterritorial reach 
of common law causes of action. By focusing too narrowly on the features of common law, 
however, Meyer’s account fails to consider the comparative institutional strengths of judges and 
legislators. The question Meyer should ask, then, is whether judges or legislators are more likely 
to achieve his goal of remedying extraterritorial infringements of universal rights without 
offending the dignity of co-equal sovereigns. As demonstrated above, Meyer’s labels of 
“common,” “commoner,” and “constrained” do not in themselves establish that judges win this 
comparative institutional contest. Indeed, the political branches have some advantages too—
accountability, legitimacy, and a broader perspective on social welfare as opposed to a focus on 
individual disputes. 
Further research should explore how the branches can work together on extraterritorial policy. 
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a judicial tool to (depending on whom you ask) 
predict and/or constrain legislative preference. And legislatures can overrule judicially created 
rules.23 How, then, should a system be calibrated to take advantage of the different strengths of 
the branches? Should courts take some of the lawmaking reigns from legislatures, or should 
legislatures preempt more common law in areas that likely have extraterritorial implications? 
Should legislatures write default rules of interpretation, or is this task better left to the judicial 
branch?24 
A further question is how prescriptive jurisdiction (either for statutes or common law) fits 
with other doctrines that protect due process and avoid clashes with co-equal sovereigns. 
Prescriptive jurisdiction is just one of the many levers that courts can pull to promote these 
interests. Personal jurisdiction reflects similar concerns, and it may protect defendants from 
foreign procedures and remedies. In a world of concurrent jurisdiction, venue also might be an 
important tool of judicial equilibration—allocating cases among courts when multiple states have 
the authority to prescribe rules and adjudicate disputes.25 Ignoring the interrelationships among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22. Meyer, supra note 5, at 340. 
23. This observation applies to judicially created substantive rules as well as judicially created rules of interpretation, 
provided that the rule does not have constitutional origins. 
24. One of us has explored the possibility of Congress writing an interpretative statute for extraterritoriality. Zachary 
D. Clopton, Extraterritoriality and Extranationality: A Comparative Study, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 217, 258–
60 (2013) (discussing this proposal in light of interpretation acts in Canada and Australia). 
25. See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in 
National Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 203, 205 (2001) (coining the term “jurisdictional equilibration” to describe lis 
pendens, antisuit injunctions and forum non conveniens). 
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these doctrines can lead courts to overreact to problematic cases rather than narrowly tailor their 
solutions.26 
In sum, we believe that a categorical distinction between common law and statutes for 
deciding extraterritorial application of U.S. law may not serve the relevant policy interests. 
Instead, a more fine-grained assessment of the substantive law, the strengths of the branches and 
their interrelationships, and other avenues to regulate international lawmaking is required to map 
out a regime for extraterritoriality in all of its forms. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26. It is not clear, for example, that a decision about the substantive scope of ATS causes of action in Kiobel 
responded to the Court’s concerns as well as decisions on personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens would have. 
